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UNLIMITED DATA?:
PLACING LIMITS ON SEARCHING CELL PHONE
DATA INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST
Thomas Rosso*
The “search incident to arrest exception” is one of several exceptions to
the general requirement that police must obtain a warrant supported by
probable cause before conducting a search. Under the exception, an officer
may lawfully search an arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s
immediate control without a warrant or probable cause, so long as the
search is conducted contemporaneously with the lawful arrest. The U.S.
Supreme Court has justified the exception based on the need for officers to
discover and remove any weapons or destructible evidence that may be
within the arrestee’s reach. Additionally, the Court has held that, under the
exception, police may search any containers found on the arrestee’s person
without examining the likelihood of uncovering weapons or evidence
related to the arrestee’s offense. In light of these principles, should the
exception permit officers to search the data of a cell phone found on an
arrestee’s person?
In January 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review two
appellate rulings and resolve a split among the circuits and state courts on
this question. This Note examines three approaches courts have taken to
resolve the issue: a broad approach, a middle approach, and a narrow
approach. This Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the
narrow approach and prohibit warrantless searches of cell phone data
under the exception.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine Willie Robinson is driving through a residential neighborhood in
Washington, D.C.1 A police officer in the neighborhood has reason to
believe that Mr. Robinson is driving on a revoked license, which is an
arrestable offense in the District of Columbia. The officer pulls Mr.
Robinson over and, after confirming that he does not have a valid driver’s
license, places him under arrest. In accordance with local police
procedures, the officer begins to search Mr. Robinson. During the search,
the officer feels a rectangular item in Mr. Robinson’s front shirt pocket. He
removes it and sees that it is an iPhone. After handcuffing Mr. Robinson,
the officer unlocks the phone and begins to scroll through Mr. Robinson’s
recent messages. After reading through several of Mr. Robinson’s emails
and text messages, he finds a text message from a known drug dealer using
a slang term for heroin. This text message is later used as evidence against
Mr. Robinson in a conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin.
This hypothetical is adapted from a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in
1973,2 which was obviously long before individuals carried sophisticated
electronic devices such as iPhones. In that case, the item that the officer
found in Mr. Robinson’s pocket was a cigarette pack rather than an iPhone.3
The officer opened the pack and inside found several heroin capsules.4 The
Supreme Court held that the search was lawful under the “search incident to
arrest exception,” which is one of several exceptions to the general
requirement that a search may only be conducted pursuant to a warrant
supported by probable cause.5
Under the exception, police may lawfully search an arrestee’s person and
the area within the arrestee’s immediate control without a warrant or
probable cause for the search, so long as the search is conducted
contemporaneously with the lawful arrest.6 The exception has been
justified by the need for officers to search for and remove any weapons or
destructible evidence that may be within the defendant’s reach.7 United
States v. Robinson established that a lawful arrest authorizes police officers
to conduct this type of warrantless search without examining in each case
the likelihood of uncovering weapons or evidence related to the crime of
arrest.8 The case also established that police may search the contents of any
“containers” found on the arrestee’s person during such a search.9 As noted
above, in Robinson, the “container” was a cigarette pack,10 but courts
1. See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (discussing an
analogous factual scenario).
2. See id. at 218.
3. Id. at 223.
4. Id.
5. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967).
6. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235–36; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63
(1969) (establishing the scope of the search incident to arrest exception).
7. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63.
8. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
9. Id. at 236.
10. Id. at 223.
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following Robinson have also held that searches of wallets11 and address
books12 are lawful under the search incident to arrest exception.
Courts have struggled to determine whether the Robinson rule allows
police officers to search data on a cell phone found on an arrestee’s person
during a search incident to an arrest.13 Some have held that a cell phone is
essentially a “container” of information and may be lawfully searched just
like a cigarette pack, wallet, or address book.14 These courts have stated
that the heightened privacy interest an arrestee may have in his cell phone
should not control the lawfulness of a search of its contents.15 Moreover,
courts have reasoned that the interest in establishing bright-line rules to
guide on-the-spot police judgments supports applying Robinson to cell
phone searches.16 Otherwise, both police officers and courts would
arguably face difficult line-drawing problems, requiring post hoc
determinations, which the Supreme Court has sought to avoid.17
However, other courts have held that a cell phone is distinguishable from
a physical container, and therefore the generalization created by the
Robinson rule should not govern cell phone searches.18 These courts have
noted that information stored on cell phones is, “by and large, of a highly
personal nature,” including “photographs, videos, written and audio
messages (text, email, and voicemail), contacts, calendar appointments, web
search and browsing history, purchases, and financial and medical
records.”19 Moreover, a modern cell phone may carry the equivalent of
millions of pages of text.20 Therefore, it is argued that a modern cell phone
contains the volume and substance of information that “one would

11. See infra note 100.
12. See infra note 101.
13. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct.
999 (2014) (“Courts have struggled to apply the Supreme Court’s search-incident-to-arrest
jurisprudence to the search of data on a cell phone seized from the person.”).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007); People v.
Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 509 (Cal. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Ga. 2012).
15. See Diaz, 244 P.3d at 508 (“‘[T]he lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement
of any privacy interest the arrestee may have’ in property immediately associated with his or
her person at the time of arrest, even if there is no reason to believe the property contains
weapons or evidence.” (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981))); Hawkins,
723 S.E.2d at 926 (“[T]he mere fact that there is a potentially high volume of information
stored in the cell phone should not control the question of whether that electronic container
may be searched.”).
16. See, e.g., Diaz, 244 P.3d at 508.
17. See id. at 508–09 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004)).
18. See, e.g., Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8–9; State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009).
19. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8; see also Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 732 (Fla. 2013)
(distinguishing Robinson based on the “very personal and vast nature of the information”
stored on modern cell phones); Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954 (“Even the more basic models of
modern cell phones are capable of storing a wealth of digitized information wholly unlike
any physical object found within a closed container.”).
20. See Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8 (citing Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, a Cell Phone
Is Not a Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell
Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. COURTS L. REV. 37, 42 (2012))
(noting that an Apple iPhone 5 model comes with sixty-four gigabytes of storage, which is
enough to store 4 million pages of text).
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previously have stored in one’s home and that would have been off-limits to
officers performing a search incident to arrest.”21 This arguably establishes
a heightened expectation of privacy in cell phones compared to other
containers, warranting a different set of rules to govern cell phone
searches.22
Some courts have concluded that the rationales justifying the search
incident to arrest exception simply do not apply to cell phone searches, and
therefore the exception does not permit warrantless searches of cell phone
data.23 These courts have reasoned that cell phones are not dangerous to
arresting officers and that the risk of evidence being lost or destroyed is
eliminated once the cell phone is seized from the arrestee.24
Other courts have concluded that searching a cell phone incident to an
arrest should be limited under the exception but not eliminated.25 These
courts have held that searching a cell phone seized from an arrestee’s
person should be permitted only when it is reasonable to believe that
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found on the device.26
Although this approach has not been applied above the trial-court level,
several commentators have advocated for this approach.27 They argue that
the approach is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v.
Gant,28 which permits vehicle searches incident to an arrest where it is
reasonable to believe evidence related to the crime of arrest might be found
in the vehicle.29 However, in Gant, the Court explicitly limited its holding
to the vehicle search context, so it is not clear that the Court would be
willing to extend its decision to cell phone searches.30
In January 2014, the Court granted certiorari to review two appellate
rulings on this issue.31 The Court’s decision will have a substantial impact
on privacy rights. Law enforcement agencies executed an estimated
12,196,959 arrests in 2012.32 Meanwhile, the rate of cell phone ownership

21. Id. at 8.
22. See id. at 8–9.
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
29. Id. at 343.
30. See id.
31. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 999
(2014); Riley v. California, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 999 (2014). Oral argument is scheduled for April 29, 2014. See
Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2013: For the Session Beginning April
21, 2014, SUPREME CT. U.S. (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalApr2014.pdf.
32. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT:
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested/arrestmain.pdf.
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in the United States has grown substantially in recent years.33 As of May
2013, 91 percent of surveyed American adults reported owning a cell
phone, compared with 66 percent in January 2005.34 Additionally, a
rapidly growing percentage of Americans own smartphones, which can
carry far more information and have many more uses than traditional
phones.35 Fifty-five percent of surveyed Americans reported that their cell
phone is a smartphone in June 2013, up from 33 percent in May 2011.36
This suggests that if police are automatically permitted to search the data of
an arrestee’s cell phone incident to an arrest, several million such searches
could occur yearly in the United States.
Part I of this Note examines the history of the search incident to arrest
exception, focusing particularly on the Supreme Court’s search for brightline rules regarding the scope of the exception. Part II introduces three
approaches to applying the doctrine to cell phone searches: a broad
approach, a middle approach, and a narrow approach. Part III argues that
courts should adopt the narrow approach and prohibit warrantless searches
of cell phone data under the search incident to arrest exception.
I. THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATE OF THE
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures,” and states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”37 The Amendment was
adopted largely in response to British abuses of the warrant system during
the Colonial Era.38 The Supreme Court has held that, under the
Amendment, warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable,” and are
therefore prohibited, “subject only to a few specifically established and
Commentators have noted that,
well-delineated exceptions.”39
notwithstanding this assertion, the exceptions to the warrant requirement

33. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., SMARTPHONE OWNERSHIP—2013 UPDATE, at 8 (2013),
available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Smartphone_adoption_
2013_PDF.pdf.
34. Id. at 8–9.
35. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., CELL PHONE ACTIVITIES 2 (2012), available at
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_CellActivities_11.25.pdf.;
PEW
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 33, at 2.
36. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 33, at 2.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
38. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 23–40 (2008) (discussing how American colonial opposition to general
warrants and writs of assistance spurred the adoption of search and seizure protections in
state constitutions and, ultimately, contributed to the creation of Fourth Amendment);
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.1(a), at 3–8 (5th ed. 2012).
39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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are in fact “neither few nor well-delineated.”40 Rather, the warrant
“requirement” may be thought of as a strong preference, subject to many
broad exceptions.41
This Part discusses the establishment, refinement, and application of the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Part I.A
discusses the development of the exception from its inception through
Chimel v. California,42 which articulated the modern rationales for the
exception. Part I.B discusses the Supreme Court’s search for bright-line
rules regarding the scope of the exception.
A. Origins of the Exception and the Pre-Chimel Era
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the search incident to arrest
exception in dictum of Weeks v. United States43 in 1914. The Court noted
the government’s right, “always recognized under English and American
law,” and “uniformly maintained,” to “search the person of the accused
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of
crime.”44
Following Weeks, the Court vacillated between broad and narrow
interpretations of the exception for over fifty years.45 Weeks acknowledged
only the right to search an arrestee’s person.46 However, in 1927, the Court
held that police could also search “the place” of arrest, which encompassed
“all parts of the premises used for [an] unlawful purpose.”47 This broad
rule, however, was short-lived. In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States,48 the Court invalidated a search of an office in which the defendant
was arrested.49 Similarly, in United States v. Lefkowitz,50 the Court held
40. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1473–74 (1985) (noting that there are over twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement);
see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
770–71 (1994) (“[I]t makes no sense to say that all warrantless searches and seizures are per
se unreasonable.”); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 481 (1991) (asserting that the
per se unreasonableness of warrantless searches should be replaced with a less rigid but more
consistently enforced standard).
41. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 4.1(a), at 560.
42. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
43. 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (dictum).
44. Id.
45. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755 (noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions on the issue
“have been far from consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident”); James J.
Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine:
Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1421–25.
46. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
47. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
48. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
49. See id. at 349–50, 358. The Court noted that in Marron, the officers had not
conducted a “general search or rummaging of the place,” whereas in Go-Bart the officers
“made a general and apparently unlimited search, ransacking the desk, safe, filing cases and
other parts of the office.” Id. at 358. Additionally, the Court recognized that in Marron, the
arrestee was engaged in committing an offense at the time of his arrest and the seized items
were plainly visible to the officers and were “in the offender’s immediate custody,” which
was not the case in Go-Bart. Id.
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that an “exploratory and general” evidence-gathering search of a single
room was unlawful.51
After approximately fifteen years of contraction,52 the Court again
upheld a broader search in Harris v. United States,53 which involved the
search of an arrestee’s four-room apartment following his arrest for fraud
related to military draft cards.54 The Court held that searches incident to an
arrest “may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises under his immediate control.”55
The Court concluded that the search was reasonable because it was
“specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities of the charged
crime,” which were likely to be concealed and could have been anywhere in
the apartment.56
The Supreme Court briefly retreated from Harris,57 but shortly thereafter
upheld another broad, thorough search in United States v. Rabinowitz.58
Over Justice Frankfurter’s forceful dissent,59 the Rabinowitz Court upheld a
ninety-minute search of the office in which the defendant was arrested.60
For nineteen years, Rabinowitz stood for the proposition that a “warrantless
search ‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may generally extend to the area that is
considered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the person
arrested.”61 However, as one commentator has noted, a thorough analysis
of the Court’s decisions during that period suggests a gradual erosion of this
right, foreshadowing the Court’s overruling of Rabinowitz in Chimel.62
In Chimel, officers arrested the defendant in his home for burglary of a
coin shop.63 The officers then conducted a search of the defendant’s threebedroom home, including his attic, garage, and small workshop that lasted
between forty-five minutes and an hour.64 The search uncovered several
items tying the defendant to the burglary.65 Relying on Rabinowitz, the
California trial and appellate courts held that the search was lawful.66 The

50. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
51. Id. at 465–67.
52. See Tomkovicz, supra note 45, at 1424.
53. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
54. See id. at 146–47, 155.
55. Id. at 151.
56. Id. at 152–53 (“[T]he area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be
determined by the fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took place in the living room as
contrasted to some other room of the apartment.”).
57. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948) (holding that a search
incident to arrest is a “strictly limited right” that must be justified by “something more in the
way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest”), overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
58. 339 U.S. 56.
59. Id. at 68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 58–59, 66 (majority opinion).
61. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760.
62. See Tomkovicz, supra note 45, at 1425–26.
63. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753.
64. Id. at 754.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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U.S. Supreme Court reversed, overruling Rabinowitz and holding that the
search did not fall within the proper scope of the search incident to arrest
exception.67
The Court supported its departure from Rabinowitz’s broader holding on
two grounds. First, the Court held that Rabinowitz was “hardly founded on
an unimpeachable line of authority,” noting that the Rabinowitz Court
disregarded the narrower approaches taken in Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and
Trupiano v. United States and elevated mere dictum in Weeks far beyond its
original authority.68 Second, the Court stated that broad authority to search
an arrestee’s home following an arrest contradicted the “background and
purpose” of the Fourth Amendment, which was adopted in response to
extensive home searches conducted under general warrants during the
colonial era.69
The Court held that a search incident to arrest may only extend to the
arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.70
The Court described two rationales justifying a search limited to this
scope.71 First, the Court held that it is reasonable for an officer to search
the arrestee’s person and immediate surrounding area to remove weapons
the arrestee might use to resist or escape the arrest.72 “Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.”73
Second, the Court held that it is reasonable to search the arrestee’s person
and area within his immediate control to prevent the arrestee from
destroying or concealing evidence.74 The Court concluded that a search
beyond this scope would not be justified by the rationales for the
exception.75
B. Searching for a Bright-Line Rule
Although Chimel articulated the scope and rationales of the search
incident to arrest exception, the Court did not address whether a search is
lawful only when the rationales for the exception support a particular
search, or whether instead the right to search follows automatically from the
arrest without a case-by-case inquiry into the search’s justifications. This
section analyzes that issue in two parts. First, it discusses whether a court
must examine if a particular search could reasonably have uncovered a
weapon or evidence related to the crime of arrest. Next, it examines
whether a court must assess the arrestee’s ability to have gained access to
the searched area.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 768.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 760–61.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 762–63.
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
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1. The Court Rejects a Case-By-Case Inquiry into
Whether a Search Could Reasonably Have Uncovered
Weapons or Evidence Related to the Crime of Arrest
After Chimel, lower courts were frequently forced to determine whether
the right to search follows automatically from the arrest or must instead be
supported by facts indicating some likelihood that either evidence or
weapons will be found during the particular search.76 This issue arose most
commonly “in the context of an arrest for a minor traffic violation or some
other lesser offense for which there could be no evidence and which would
not of itself suggest that the perpetrator would be armed.”77
In Robinson, the Supreme Court resolved the issue by articulating a
bright-line rule that a lawful arrest automatically provides the right to
search the arrestee, including any containers78 found on his person, without
considering the likelihood that weapons or evidence would be found during
the particular search.79
The defendant was pulled over and subsequently arrested for driving with
a revoked license.80 During a search incident to the arrest, the arresting
officer felt an item in the defendant’s shirt pocket.81 The officer removed
the object, saw that it was a cigarette pack, opened the pack, and inside
found several heroin capsules.82 The officer later testified that he did not
have any particular purpose in mind when he searched the defendant.83
The Supreme Court held that the permissible scope of the search was not
affected by the seriousness of the initial offense or likelihood of discovering
evidence related to that crime during the search.84 The Court articulated
two reasons for this conclusion. First, it rejected the assumption that
individuals arrested for driving with a revoked license are less likely to
possess dangerous weapons than individuals arrested for other crimes.85
Second, the Court fundamentally disagreed with the lower court’s
suggestion that it must be litigated in each case whether a search was
necessary to preserve officer safety or prevent destruction of evidence

76. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.2, at 128.
77. Id.
78. The Supreme Court has defined the term container as “‘any object capable of
holding another object,’” which means common “containers” such as a suitcase, backpack,
or a purse qualify as containers, but less obvious items, such as a jacket pocket or a car, are
also “containers.” See Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the
Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1414 (2010) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4
(1981)).
79. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
80. Id. at 220.
81. Id. at 222–23.
82. Id. at 223.
83. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev’d, 414 U.S.
218. The officer also testified: “I just searched him. I didn’t think about what I was looking
for. I just searched him.” Id.
84. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35.
85. Id. at 234.
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related to the crime of arrest.86 The Court held that while the search
incident to arrest exception is justified by “the need to disarm and to
discover evidence,” the authority to search “does not depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that
weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the
suspect.”87
The Court reasoned that an “officer’s determination as to how and where
to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a
quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be
broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.”88
Rather, the Court held that the lawful arrest based on probable cause is
itself sufficient to establish the authority to search, and therefore “a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.”89
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.90
The dissenters criticized the majority for departing from the Court’s “long
tradition of case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.”91 They noted that “[t]he
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is preeminently the sort of
question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the
individual case” and contended that this “intensive, at times painstaking”
inquiry reflects the Court’s “jealous regard for maintaining the integrity of
individual rights.”92
Several prominent commentators have suggested, however, that the
majority’s decision to forego a case-by-case inquiry has merit.93 A search
incident to arrest is the most common type of law enforcement search and
occurs in an extremely wide variety of circumstances, which would
arguably make difficult a detailed factual inquiry into the potential for
discovering evidence or weapons in each case.94 An arrest is also a serious
and lengthy event that leaves the officer vulnerable to attack, so items that
may not generally be dangerous could be used against the officer during an
arrest.95 Moreover, the decision to search must be made with less
forethought than most other searches, because arrests are frequently
unanticipated, and a search incident to arrest must be executed quickly if it
is to successfully prevent the destruction of evidence and preserve officer
safety.96 Thus, one prominent commentator argues,

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 238 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 239.
Id. at 238 (citations omitted).
See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.2(c), at 141; WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.5(b), at 206 (5th ed. 2009).
94. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 93, § 3.5(b), at 206.
95. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 93, § 3.5(b), at 206.
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A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands and
buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions,
may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and
judges eagerly feed, but they may be “literally impossible of application
by the officer in the field.”97

Moreover, this type of detailed analysis is arguably unnecessary because the
fact of an arrest based on probable cause is by itself sufficient to justify the
search, which is theoretically a less significant deprivation of liberty than
the arrest itself.98
Whether well reasoned or not, Robinson has had a substantial impact on
the scope of the search incident to arrest exception.99 Under Robinson,
courts have allowed searches of many different types of “containers” found
on an arrestee’s person, including those containing written information,
such as wallets100 and address books,101 without assessing the likelihood the
searched container could contain evidence or weapons.102

97. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.2(c), at 140 (quoting United States v. Robinson,
471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev’d, 414 U.S. 218).
Professor LaFave argues that the Fourth Amendment can only truly protect individual
liberties if police are acting under rules that they can consistently apply correctly; otherwise,
motions to suppress evidence may be granted, but the underlying intrusions will not abate.
See id. § 5.2(c), at 140–41.
98. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 93, § 3.5(b), at 206.
99. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.2(c), at 144–45.
100. See United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1346 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. McEachern, 675 F.2d
618, 622 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Gay, 623 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Castro, 596 F.2d 674,
677 (5th Cir. 1979).
101. See United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 777 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1504 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp.
465, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
102. However, at least one state has statutorily narrowed Robinson’s holding, and a
handful of state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to bar Robinson’s
generalization. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (LexisNexis 2002) (“A search conducted
incident to an arrest may be made only for the purposes of seizing fruits, instrumentalities,
contraband and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made . . . .”
(emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. Pierre, 893 N.E.2d 378, 381 n.4 (Mass. 2008)
(recognizing that the statute was enacted in response to Robinson); see also Jackson v. State,
791 P.2d 1023, 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (concluding on state constitutional grounds that
during a search incident to an arrest for which no evidence could exist on the person, a
search of “smaller containers which could only contain atypical weapons such as a razor
blade, a small knife, a safety pin, or a needle must be supported by specific and articulable
facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such an atypical weapon was in
the small container”); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 59 (Haw. 1974) (holding that a search
incident to arrest must be examined on a case-by-case basis and “limited in scope to a
situation where it is reasonably necessary to discover the fruits or instrumentalities of the
crime for which the defendant is arrested, or to protect the officer from attack, or to prevent
the offender from escaping”); State v. Neil, 958 A.2d 1173, 1178 (Vt. 2008) (holding that a
search of a closed container on an arrestee’s person is not lawful under the state constitution
unless justified by exigencies tied to the particular case).
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2. The Court Establishes a Somewhat More Searching Inquiry
into Whether an Arrestee Could Reasonably Have
Accessed the Searched Area
The lawfulness of a search conducted well after an arrest depends largely
on the nature of the item searched.103 A search of an arrestee’s person—
including effects “immediately associated” with the arrestee’s person—may
be lawfully conducted after the accused arrives at the place of detention,
assuming that the search would have been lawful if conducted at the time of
arrest.104 However, a search of items not “immediately associated” with the
arrestee’s person may not be conducted after law enforcement officers have
reduced the items to their “exclusive control.”105
The Court explained the reasoning for this dichotomy in United States v.
Chadwick.106 The Court concluded that, once police have brought an
arrestee’s items within their exclusive control, there is no longer a danger
that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or
destroy evidence.107 In a search of the arrestee’s person, the Court noted
that the search is nonetheless justified by the reduced expectation of privacy
an arrestee has in his person following an arrest.108 However, a search of
items not on the arrestee’s person or immediately associated with his person
at the time of arrest cannot be later justified by the reduced expectation of
privacy the arrestee has in his person following an arrest.109
A search incident to arrest may also be unlawful if the arrestee could not
have accessed the searched area to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.110
Chimel established that a search incident to arrest may only extend to the
area within which an arrestee might be able to grab a weapon or destructible
evidence.111 However, following Chimel, it was not clear how closely a
court must examine the facts of a particular case to determine whether the
arrestee could have accessed the searched area.112
The Court has elaborated on this issue in a series of cases involving
automobile searches. In New York v. Belton,113 an officer arrested four
occupants of a vehicle for drug offenses.114 After the arrestees exited the
car, the officer searched the passenger compartment and discovered cocaine

103. Compare United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1977) (holding that a
delayed search of a footlocker seized from an arrestee’s trunk was unlawful), with United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 801–02, 808–09 (1974) (upholding a delayed search of an
arrestee’s clothing).
104. See Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803.
105. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15.
106. 433 U.S. 1.
107. Id. at 15.
108. Id. at 16 n.10 (citing Edwards, 415 U.S. 800; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973)).
109. See id.
110. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).
111. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969).
112. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 457–58.
113. Id. at 454.
114. Id. at 456.
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in the pocket of a jacket in the car.115 The Court upheld the search, holding
that a vehicular search incident to arrest may extend to the full passenger
compartment of a vehicle and any containers found therein.116
The Court reasoned that officers needed a clear standard to apply in the
volatile setting of a vehicle arrest in order to carry out their duties
efficiently, safely, and effectively.117 Therefore, the Court embraced what
it called a “generalization” that items within the passenger compartment of
an automobile are within an arrestee’s reaching distance and therefore
within his immediate control.118
The Court reexamined Belton in Thornton v. United States.119 In
Thornton, an officer arrested the defendant for a drug offense as the
defendant was exiting his vehicle.120 The officer placed the defendant
under arrest, handcuffed him, put him in the back seat of the police car, and
returned to the vehicle to search it, discovering a handgun under the driver’s
seat.121 The Court held that Belton authorized the search.122
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment but
argued that the search could not be justified by the Chimel rationales.123
Justice Scalia reasoned that because the arrestee was secured and not within
reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search, “[t]he risk that he
would nevertheless grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m] from his car was
remote in the extreme.”124
However, Justice Scalia provided an alternative justification for the
search.125 He suggested that a Belton search could be justified “simply
because the car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which [the
defendant] was arrested.”126 He discussed how the Court had relied on this
justification before Chimel and argued that those cases expressed a
reasonable interpretation of what the Fourth Amendment requires.127
Therefore, Justice Scalia proposed limiting Belton searches to instances
where it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
might be found in the vehicle.”128

115. Id.
116. Id. at 460.
117. Id. at 458.
118. Id. at 460.
119. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
120. Id. at 618.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 618–19.
123. See id. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 625 (second alteration in original) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763 (1969)).
125. Id. at 629.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 629, 631 (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950),
overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1947),
overruled by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914)).
128. Id. at 632.
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In Arizona v. Gant,129 the Supreme Court again examined the
justifications for a Belton search.130 In Gant, the defendant was arrested for
driving on a suspended license.131 The officers handcuffed the defendant
and locked him in their patrol car.132 They then returned to the defendant’s
car, searched it, and found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the
backseat.133
The Court held that the search was unlawful.134 The Court established
that a Belton search is only permitted if one of two conditions is satisfied.
First, the vehicle may be searched if the arrestee is within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.135 Second, due to
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context,” the vehicle may be searched
“when it is ‘reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”136 The Court acknowledged that this
rule did not follow from Chimel and was based only on the possibility of
discovering evidence of the crime of arrest.137
The “reasonable to believe” standard from Gant is not a completely clear
line.138 In other search contexts, the phrase “reasonable to believe” is often
interpreted as requiring “probable cause.”139 At least one court has
attributed this meaning to Gant’s “reasonable to believe” language.140
However, the Gant Court could not have intended this meaning “because
otherwise Gant’s evidentiary rationale would merely duplicate the
‘automobile exception,’ which the Court specifically identified as a distinct
exception to the warrant requirement.”141 Most courts have therefore
interpreted the Gant standard as requiring only reasonable suspicion, a
lesser degree of suspicion than probable cause.142
Gant’s authority outside the context of a vehicle search is also somewhat
unclear. Some courts have applied Gant’s grab-area limitation to searches
of nonvehicles.143 However, one prominent commentator has suggested

129. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
130. Id. at 335.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 351.
136. Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
137. Id.
138. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 7.1(d), at 711 (noting that Gant “contains a variety of
language suggesting an array of possibilities” regarding the level of suspicion necessary to
conduct a search for evidence).
139. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 490 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111–12 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002).
140. United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1203 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
141. United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
142. See, e.g., id.; People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Colo. 2010); United States v.
Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 823 (D.C. 2012).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no
plausible reason why [Gant should apply] only with respect to automobile searches, rather
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that the Court’s explicit limitation of Gant’s second prong to
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context” suggests that it “appear[s] to
have no application whatsoever” to searches outside the vehicle context.144
II. APPLYING THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION
TO CELL PHONE SEARCHES
Part I examined the evolution of the search incident to arrest exception in
the Supreme Court. This Part analyzes three approaches that have been
taken to applying that doctrine to cell phone searches: a broad approach, a
middle approach, and a narrow approach.
A. The Broad Approach: Searching Cell Phone Data
Is Permitted Under the Exception
This section explores a broad approach that holds that police may
lawfully search cell phone data incident to an arrest without any cell phone–
specific limitations.
1. People v. Diaz
In People v. Diaz,145 the California Supreme Court held that police may
lawfully search the text message folder of a cell phone seized from an
arrestee’s person incident to an arrest.146 Police arrested the defendant for
drug-related offenses.147 After transferring the defendant to a police
station, the officers searched the phone and found a message connecting the
defendant to drug trafficking.148
The defendant argued that cell phones should be subject to special search
incident to arrest rules because they “contain [] quantities of personal data
unrivaled by any conventional item of evidence . . . such as an article of
clothing, a wallet, or a crumpled cigarette box found in an arrestee’s
pocket.”149 However, the court rejected this argument. The court reasoned
that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions suggested that authority to
search an item “seized from an arrestee’s person incident to a lawful
custodial arrest depends on the item’s character, including its capacity for
storing personal information.”150 Rather, the court held that Robinson
authorized a full search of the arrestee’s person without any additional
justification.151 In the court’s view, this was confirmed by Belton, which

than in any situation where the item searched is removed from the suspect’s control between
the time of the arrest and the time of the search.”).
144. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 5.5(a), at 296.
145. 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011).
146. Id. at 502.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 502–03.
149. Id. at 506 (first alteration in original).
150. Id. (emphasis omitted).
151. Id.
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held there was no need to distinguish between containers found during a
vehicle search, because “the justification for the search is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial
arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may
have.”152
The court also noted that the defendant’s approach “would create difficult
line-drawing problems.”153 The court reasoned that it would be hard to
draw a distinction between cell phones and other objects that might contain
“highly personal, intimate and private information, such as photographs,
letters, or diaries.”154 And, even if some cell phones could be distinguished
based on their storage capacity, the court failed to see why this would
justify exempting all cell phones.155 The court noted that distinguishing
some phones from others based on their storage capacity would be
impractical because officers would not be able to determine a particular
phone’s capacity during an arrest.156 Lastly, the court added that if “the
wisdom of the high court’s decisions must be newly evaluated in light of
modern technology, then that reevaluation must be undertaken by the high
court itself.”157
2. People v. Riley
Finding Diaz controlling, the California Court of Appeals upheld a search
of an arrestee’s smartphone following an arrest on gun charges in People v.
Riley.158 The search extended to photographs, videos, and a contact list
stored on the defendant’s phone.159 The defendant petitioned for certiorari,
which the U.S. Supreme Court granted in January 2014 to review the
lawfulness of the search.160

152. Id. at 507 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–
61 (1981)). In a footnote, the Diaz court recognized that Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332
(2009), limited Belton, but the court nonetheless held that Gant “reaffirmed Belton’s holding
that whether a particular container may be searched does not depend on its character or the
extent of the arrestee’s expectation of privacy in it.” Diaz, 244 P.3d at 507 n.9 (citing Gant,
556 U.S. at 345).
153. Id. at 508.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 511 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert. granted,
134 S.Ct. 999 (2014).
159. Id. at *3.
160. Riley, 134 S.Ct. 999. The question presented for review is “[w]hether evidence
admitted at petitioner’s trial was obtained in a search of petitioner’s cell phone that violated
petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Id.

2460

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

3. United States v. Finley
In United States v. Finley,161 the Fifth Circuit upheld a search of cell
phone data, including text messages and call records, under facts similar to
those in Diaz.162 Police arrested the defendant for a narcotics offense and
seized a cell phone from his person.163 The officers transferred the
defendant to another location and then searched the phone.164
The court reasoned that, under Robinson, police could search the phone
for evidence in order to preserve it for later use at trial.165 The court also
relied on a Seventh Circuit case that held a search of a pager was lawful
under Robinson.166
4. United States v. Murphy
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar holding in United States v.
Murphy.167 In Murphy, the defendant was arrested for obstruction of justice
for providing a false identity during a vehicle stop.168 A cell phone was
subsequently discovered on the defendant’s person and searched.169
The court held that the search was lawful, referencing the “‘manifest
need . . . to preserve evidence’” recognized in its prior electronic search
cases.170 The defendant conceded that a phone with a small storage
capacity could be searched without a warrant because its data was
“volatile.”171 However, he argued that a cell phone with a larger storage
capacity could not be searched without a warrant because its content would
implicate a heightened privacy interest.172
The court rejected this argument, finding no meaningful way to quantify
a “large” storage capacity as opposed to a “small” storage capacity.173 The
court also noted there was no reason to assume that information would be
more “volatile” when stored on a phone with a smaller storage capacity.174
Lastly, forcing police officers to determine a phone’s storage capacity
before searching it “would simply be an unworkable and unreasonable
rule.”175

161. 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
162. Id. at 253–54.
163. Id. at 254.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 259–60.
166. Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996)).
167. 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009).
168. Id. at 407–08.
169. Id. at 409.
170. Id. at 411–12 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x
242, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2008)).
171. Id. at 411.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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5. United States v. Flores-Lopez
In United States v. Flores-Lopez,176 police arrested the defendant for
drug-related offenses.177 At the scene of the arrest, officers searched the
defendant and seized a cell phone from his person. They then searched the
phone to determine its number.178 The Seventh Circuit held that the search
was lawful but reserved the possibility that a more intrusive cell phone
search might not be permissible.179
Judge Posner examined the potential justifications for a search of cell
phone data incident to an arrest.180 He concluded that a cell phone poses no
danger once securely in the possession of an arresting officer, so an
electronic search of cell phone data could not be justified by police officers’
reasonable concerns for their safety.181 However, he determined that a cell
phone search could conceivably be justified by the government’s interest in
preserving evidence.182 It is possible for a user who does not have physical
access to a phone to remotely delete its data.183 Judge Posner reasoned that
this “remote-wiping” technology could theoretically be used by an
arrestee’s accomplice to destroy incriminating evidence.184 The wiped data
could be recoverable in a laboratory, but this process would create a
delay.185
Ultimately, Judge Posner concluded that balancing the justifications for a
search against its invasion of privacy interests is not necessary under
Robinson.186 Rather, a search incident to arrest is automatically permitted
as long as it is no more invasive than, “say, a frisk, or the search of a
conventional container.”187 Because a search to determine a cell phone’s
number does not exceed this level of invasiveness, the court concluded that
such a search is lawful.188 Judge Posner added that he could imagine
justifications for a more extensive search but left that question “for another
day.”189

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 804.
Id.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 806–09.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 807–08.
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 809–10.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 809–10.
Id. at 810.
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B. The Middle Approach: Searching Cell Phone Data Is Lawful Under the
Exception Only If It Is Reasonable To Believe That Evidence Relevant to the
Crime of Arrest Might Be Found on the Phone
This section examines a middle approach that permits a warrantless
search of cell phone data incident to arrest only when it is reasonable to
believe evidence related to the crime of arrest might be found on the phone.
1. United States v. Quintana
In United States v. Quintana,190 the court held that a cell phone search
incident to defendant’s arrest for driving on a suspended license was
unlawful.191 The court distinguished Finley, noting that in that case, “there
was a reasonable probability that information stored on [the defendant’s]
device was evidence of [his] crime.”192 This was true because the
defendant in Finley was arrested for drug-related activity, which is
associated with cell phone use.193 In contrast, the court noted that there was
no reason to believe evidence relevant to the defendant’s arrest for driving
on a suspended license would be found on his cell phone.194 Rather, the
court concluded that the officer was merely rummaging for evidence of an
unrelated offense.195
The court noted that, under Robinson, authority to search an arrestee’s
person incident to an arrest does not turn on the probability that weapons or
evidence will be discovered.196 However, the court nonetheless relied on
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton and comments during oral
argument in Gant (which was still undecided at that time) for the idea that a
search based on only an evidence-gathering rationale must be linked to
some probability of discovering evidence related to the arrestee’s initial
offense.197 The Court held that because the search could not have
uncovered evidence related to the defendant’s arrest for driving on a
suspended license, the search “pushe[d] the search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine beyond its limits.”198
2. United States v. McGhee
In United States v. McGhee,199 the court reached a similar conclusion.200
In that case, the defendant was arrested for narcotics offenses that he
allegedly committed ten months earlier.201 A cell phone was taken from his
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

594 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1299.
See id.
Id. at 1300.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300–01.
Id. at 1300.
No. 8:09CR31, 2009 WL 2424104 (D. Neb. July 21, 2009).
Id. at *1, *3.
Id. at *3.
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person and searched.202 The court held that the search was unlawful
because it was not reasonable for the arresting officers to believe that the
cell phone still contained evidence relevant to the offenses.203
* * *
To date, the evidence-based approach has been employed only by two
trial courts.204 However, several commentators have argued that the
approach should be widely adopted.205
First, these commentators contend that Robinson should not apply to cell
phone searches. Professor Kerr argues that Robinson made sense in its day
only because the search that the Court envisioned was necessarily narrow in
scope.206 At that time, a search of an individual’s person might uncover
“keys, a wallet, cigarettes, or a small amount of narcotics.”207 In contrast,
searches of cell phones can uncover “the equivalent of many millions of
pages of text.”208 Additionally, Professor Kerr argues that the Chimel
rationales do not justify routine searches of cell phones.209 “No one thinks
that an electronic search through a cell phone might reveal a dangerous
weapon,” and in most cases the search also will not preserve evidence
related to the crime of arrest.210
As a solution, Professor Kerr argues that cell phone searches should be
permitted “only when justified by the evidence-preserving rationale
justifying the exception.”211 He points to Gant as doctrinal support for this
approach.212 As discussed above, Gant established that a vehicle search
incident to arrest is lawful if either of two conditions are met: first, if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search;
and second, if it is reasonable to believe that evidence related to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.213
Professor Kerr suggests that the first prong of Gant may be unnecessary
for cell phone searches because a cell phone can easily be removed from an
arrestee’s reach.214 However, he argues that the second prong should be

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See id.; see also United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla.
2009).
205. See, e.g., Clifford S. Fishman, Searching Cell Phones After Arrest: Exceptions to
the Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 995, 1039–40 (2013);
Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 403, 406–07 (2013); Ben E. Stewart, Note, Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest: A
New Standard Based on Arizona v. Gant, 99 KY. L.J. 579, 598 (2011).
206. Kerr, supra note 205, at 404.
207. Id. at 404.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 405.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 407.
212. Id. at 406.
213. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
214. Kerr, supra note 205, at 406.
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applied to cell phone searches.215 Under this approach, a cell phone could
be lawfully searched pursuant to the exception “only when ‘it is reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found’ in the
device.”216
Commentators have suggested that this rule would substantially reduce
the number of cell phone searches conducted incident to arrest because, for
many crimes, any potential evidence in the arrestee’s cell phone will not be
related to the reason for his arrest.217 Professor Gershowitz argues that this
would be the case for “traffic offenses, murder, rape, and robbery.”218
Similarly, Professor Kerr notes that an individual arrested for drunk driving
would probably not have evidence related to his offense on his cell
phone.219 On the other hand, he suggests that “[a] person charged with
making a threat by telephone might have records of the threat on his
phone.”220
However, even a proponent of this approach acknowledges it “will not
provide a quick and easy solution.”221 Indeed, it is far from clear whether a
cell phone search would be automatically justified following, for example, a
drug arrest.222 In dictum, the Quintana court stated that such a search
would be lawful.223 Professor Gershowitz has agreed, reasoning that cell
phones are recognized tools of the drug trade.224 However, Professor Kerr
has stated that a person arrested for possessing marijuana probably would
not have evidence related to the offense stored on his phone.225
Under the evidence-based approach, the permissible scope of the search
is also unclear.226 Professor Gershowitz notes that even permissible
searches would be limited in scope under this rule.227 For example, he
contends that it would make sense to search a phone’s text messages for
evidence of a drug-related crime, because that function is commonly used in
conjunction with drug sales.228 However, photos and internet browsing
history would be off-limits, he argues, because that information would
likely have nothing to do with drug sales.229

215. Id.
216. Id. at 406–07 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).
217. See id. at 405–06; see also Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth
Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 49 (2008).
218. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell
Phone from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1145 (2011).
219. See Kerr, supra note 205, at 405.
220. Id.
221. Fishman, supra note 205, at 1039.
222. See id. at 1038–39.
223. United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (dictum).
224. Gershowitz, supra note 218, at 1146.
225. Kerr, supra note 205, at 405–06.
226. Fishman, supra note 205, at 1039.
227. Gershowitz, supra note 217, at 49.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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C. The Narrow Approach: Searching Cell Phone Data
Is Not Permitted Under the Exception
This section focuses on a narrow approach that prohibits searches of cell
phone data under the exception.
1. State v. Smith
In State v. Smith,230 the Ohio Supreme Court held that police may not
search the contents of a cell phone pursuant to the search incident to arrest
exception.231 In Smith, police arrested the defendant in his home for
narcotics distribution, searched him, and found a cell phone on his
person.232 After transporting the defendant to the police station, an officer
searched the contents of the phone, including its call history.233
The court held that the search was unlawful.234 The court reasoned that a
cell phone is not analogous to a container; rather, objects falling under the
definition of a “closed container” had traditionally been “physical objects
capable of holding other physical objects.”235 The court noted that this
limitation was supported by the Supreme Court’s definition of a “container”
as “any object capable of holding another object.”236
The court recognized that other courts had previously upheld searches of
pagers and electronic memo books under the exception, but the court noted
that these courts failed to consider the Supreme Court’s container
definition.237 Moreover, the court distinguished these searches from
searches of cell phone data.238 The court reasoned that even the least
advanced cell phones today are capable of holding far more information
than a pager or electronic organizer.239 The court determined that this
capability gives the users of cell phones “a reasonable and justifiable
expectation of a higher level of privacy in the information they contain.”240
The court also noted that once a cell phone is in police custody, “the state
has satisfied its immediate interest in collecting and preserving evidence
and can take preventative steps to ensure that the data found on the phone
are neither lost nor erased.”241 Balancing the state’s limited interest against
the arrestee’s heightened privacy interest, the court concluded that after

230. 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
231. Id. at 956.
232. Id. at 950.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 954.
236. Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
237. Id. (citing United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385,
1390 (D. Nev. 1991)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 955.
241. Id.
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seizing a cell phone incident to an arrest, “police must then obtain a warrant
before intruding into the phone’s contents.”242
2. Smallwood v. State
The Supreme Court of Florida reached a similar holding in Smallwood v.
State.243 In that case, the arresting officer seized a cell phone from the
defendant’s person during a search incident to an arrest for robbery.244 The
officer searched for data on the phone and discovered five digital images
relevant to the suspected robbery.245
The court held that the warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone
was unlawful, reasoning that Robinson did not control its decision because
“that case clearly did not involve the search of a modern electronic device
and the extensive information and data held in a cell phone.”246 Following
Robinson would require analogizing a crumpled package of cigarettes to a
modern cell phone, which, the court held, would be “like comparing a onecell organism to a human being.”247 The court discussed the “[v]ast
amounts of private, personal information” stored in cell phones, “including
not just phone numbers and call history, but also photos, videos, bank
records, medical information, daily planners, and even correspondence
between individuals through applications such as Facebook and Twitter.”248
In contrast, Robinson involved a “static, non-interactive container.”249
Therefore, the court distinguished, in terms of both quantity and quality, the
type of information stored on a cell phone compared with that contained in
other items found on an arrestee’s person.250
The court also concluded that after the phone was removed from the
defendant’s person, “there was no possibility that [the defendant] could use
the device as a weapon, nor could he have destroyed any evidence that may
have existed on the phone.”251 Therefore, neither an officer-safety nor
preservation-of-evidence rationale could justify the search, which therefore
required a warrant.252
242. Id. Although the court held the search was not justified under the search incident to
arrest exception, it left open the possibility that such a search could be justified in
circumstances involving an exigency. Id.
243. 113 So. 3d 724 (Fla. 2013).
244. Id. at 726–27.
245. Id. at 727–28.
246. Id. at 731, 740–41.
247. Id. at 732.
248. Id. at 731–32. The court also discussed the potential for a search of a cell phone to
“evolve into a search of the interior of an arrestee’s home” through existing technology that
integrates cell phones with home computer webcams. Id. at 732 (citing United States v.
Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805–06 (7th Cir. 2012)).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 733 (“[E]ven justices on this Court routinely use cellular phones to access
Court email accounts, and highly confidential communications are received daily on these
electronic devices.”).
251. Id. at 735.
252. Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009)). The court noted that Gant
also held, “Circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful
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3. United States v. Wurie
In United States v. Wurie,253 the First Circuit became the first federal
circuit court to hold a cell phone search incident to arrest unlawful.254
Officers arrested the defendant for distributing crack cocaine and took him
to the police station, where they seized a cell phone from his person.255
Several minutes later, officers at the station noticed the phone repeatedly
ringing and observed that the incoming calls were identified as coming
from “my house” on the external identification screen on the front of the
phone.256 They opened the phone to examine its call log and hit two
buttons to identify the number associated with “my house.”257
The government argued that Robinson authorized a full search of the
phone without any justification other than a lawful arrest.258 However, the
court rejected this as an overly formalistic view of Robinson.259 The court
conceded that “Robinson speaks broadly” and that the Supreme Court has
never limited a search incident to arrest based on the type of item
searched.260 However, the court distinguished a cell phone search from
other searches incident to an arrest because of the substantial volume and
breadth of highly personal information stored on a cell phone.261 Allowing
a warrantless search of this “virtual warehouse” of private information
would harken back to the general searches of the colonial era, which had
inspired the Framers to adopt the Fourth Amendment.262 Moreover, the
Robinson Court could not have imagined that this level of intrusiveness
would spring from its decision, because the Court “could not have
envisioned a world in which the vast majority of arrestees would be
carrying on their person an item containing not physical evidence but a vast
store of intangible data.”263
The court also held that cell phone searches as a category can never be
justified by the Chimel rationales.264 The court concluded that a cell

arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle.’” Id. at 735 n.6 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343). However, because the
defendant’s arrest did not involve a vehicle, the court determined that justification did not
apply. See id.
253. 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 999.
254. Id. at 13.
255. Id. at 2.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 7.
259. Id. at 7, 10.
260. Id. at 9.
261. Id. at 8 (discussing how a modern cell phone may store the equivalent of up to four
million pages of text and noting that the information stored is “by and large, of a highly
personal nature: photographs, videos, written and audio messages (text, email, and
voicemail), contacts, calendar appointments, web search and browsing history, purchases,
and financial and medical records”).
262. Id. at 9 (noting that such a highly intrusive search could occur even if an individual
is arrested “for something as minor as a traffic violation”).
263. Id. at 12.
264. Id. at 10.
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phone’s data does not pose a threat to officer safety.265 Moreover, a cell
phone search cannot be justified by a need to preserve evidence, because
police officers have at least three options available to prevent data in a
seized phone from being lost or destroyed.266 First, they can turn the phone
off or take out its battery.267 Second, they can place the phone in an
inexpensive device that prevents data from being remotely deleted.268
Third, they can copy the phone’s contents to another device.269
Additionally, the court held that a bright-line rule was necessary for cell
phone searches.270
A series of opinions allowing some cell phone data searches but not
others, based on the nature and reasonableness of the intrusion, would
create exactly the “inherently subjective and highly fact specific” set of
rules that the Court has warned against and would be extremely difficult
for officers in the field to apply.271

Therefore, even though the search of the defendant’s cell phone was limited
to his call log, the court found it necessary for all cell phone data searches
to be governed by the same rule in order to protect against more invasive
searches of text messages, emails, or photographs.272 The court thus held
that “the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the
warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee’s
person.”273
III. PLACING LIMITS ON SEARCHING CELL PHONE DATA
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST
The previous Part identified three approaches to applying the search
incident to arrest exception to searches of cell phone data. This Part argues
that courts should adopt the narrow approach and prohibit warrantless
searches of cell phone data under the search incident to arrest exception.
Part III.A explains that the broad approach is not required by Robinson and
is not justified by a need to protect police officers or preserve evidence.
Part III.B suggests that the middle approach would likely prove unworkable
and would permit searches that are unreasonable because they are not
necessary to preserve evidence related to an arrestee’s crime. Part III.C
argues that the narrow approach is the only solution that provides a
workable framework for law enforcement and protects an individual’s
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12–13 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004)).
Id. at 13.
Id.
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A. The Broad Approach Is Not Required by Robinson and
Is Not Justified by the Chimel Rationales
The broad approach does not follow from the Supreme Court’s holding in
Robinson, because a modern cell phone shares few of the characteristics of
a physical container.274 A typical cell phone today stores far more
information than an individual could carry on his person in a physical
container.275 Additionally, unlike physical containers, which will only
occasionally contain personal information, a cell phone is very likely to
contain some of a person’s most private information, “including not just
phone numbers and call history, but also photos, videos, bank records,
medical information, daily planners, and even correspondence between
individuals through applications such as Facebook and Twitter.”276 Nearly
forty years ago, the Robinson Court could not have envisioned that at least
half of Americans would be regularly carrying a device capable of storing
such a vast quantity of personal information.277 Therefore, Robinson does
not require permitting the search of a cell phone found on an arrestee’s
person incident to an arrest.
Additionally, the broad approach is not justified by the Chimel rationales.
A cell phone does not pose a danger to police officers once removed from a
defendant’s possession.278 Unlike pagers and early cell phones, even the
most basic modern cell phones have significant storage capacities, which
substantially reduces the chance that data will be automatically deleted from
them.279 It is also very unlikely that a phone’s contents could be remotely
destroyed. An arrestee would be unable to remotely delete data while
detained, and presumably during that time, an arrestee’s communication
with outsiders would be monitored for illegal activity, including conspiring
to destroy evidence. Even in the unlikely event that “remote wiping”
proved to be a legitimate problem, police departments could prevent data
from being destroyed by turning the phone off or placing it in an
inexpensive device that prevents the phone from receiving an outside
signal.280 In short, unless the loss or destruction of data through remote
wiping proves to be a problem, this concern does not warrant allowing
police to search thousands or potentially millions of devices that store some
of the public’s most personal information.

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See supra notes 246–50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 732 (Fla. 2013).
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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B. The Middle Approach Is Self-Contradictory, Overstates the EvidencePreservation Rationale, and Would Likely Prove Unworkable
The middle approach is self-contradictory. On the one hand, advocates
of the approach correctly point out that the incredible volume and breadth
of personal information stored on a cell phone supports deviating from the
Robinson rule.281 However, on the other hand, they claim that in most
arrest situations, it would be unreasonable to believe that evidence related to
an arrestee’s crime might be found somewhere in this vast store of data.282
In fact, in most arrest situations, it would likely be reasonable for an
officer to believe that evidence related to an arrestee’s crime might be found
on his cell phone. Text messages are commonly offered as evidence in
cases of murder,283 robbery,284 and rape.285 When a defendant is arrested
for a violent crime, it is also not uncommon for police to find incriminating
photographs on the arrestee’s phone.286 Similarly, in a drug arrest, it would
likely be reasonable to believe that an arrestee’s contact list might contain
evidence of drug associations.287 A variety of other incriminating data,
including emails and social media content could arguably be found on an
arrestee’s cell phone in other types of arrests. For example, someone
arrested for driving on a suspended license might have a notice of the
suspension in his email messages.288 Even an individual arrested for
driving under the influence might have recently used a social media
application to post that he was at a bar.289
As cell phones continue to become more integrated into our lives, it will
only become more reasonable to believe that evidence related to an
arrestee’s offense might be found in his cell phone. The storage capacity
and number of applications on a typical cell phone has increased
dramatically in recent years, and, as this continues, users will likely store
more personal information on their phones.290
However, the mere possibility of discovering evidence related to an
arrestee’s offense is not sufficient to support a search under the Fourth

281. See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Gulley v. State, No. CR 11–271, 2012 WL 4712207, at *2 (Ark. Oct. 4,
2012); State v. Elseman, 841 N.W.2d 225, 229–30 (Neb. 2014).
284. See, e.g., United States v. McCreary, 308 F. App’x 39, 41 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Hunter, 266 F. App’x 619, 621–23 (9th Cir. 2008).
285. See e.g., Long v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-SC-000801-MR, 2011 WL 6826377, at
*1 (Ky. Dec. 22, 2011); People v. Green, 967 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755–56 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
286. See Fishman, supra note 205, at 1039.
287. See supra notes 223–24.
288. This would be relevant to demonstrate knowledge of the suspension, which is
commonly an element of the offense. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.34(2) (West 2001 &
Supp. 2013).
289. Cf. United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(considering the admission of evidence pulled from the defendant’s Facebook profile); Smith
v. State, 2012-KA-00218-COA, 2013 WL 2400393, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. June 4, 2013)
(considering the admission of Facebook messages).
290. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Amendment.291 Rather, the search incident to arrest exception is justified
only by the two rationales articulated in Chimel.292 As discussed in Part
III.A, cell phone searches cannot be justified by these rationales, because
cell phones do not pose a danger to police officers and the possibility of a
cell phone’s data being lost or destroyed after it is seized by police is
extremely remote.
Some commentators have suggested that the middle approach could be
justified as an adaptation or extension of Gant.293 However, courts and
commentators should be careful to not overstate the significance of Gant on
cell phone searches. Gant is fundamentally about the proper scope of an
arrestee’s grab area in the context of a vehicle search.294 This is not an
issue when a cell phone is found on an arrestee’s person. Moreover, the
Gant Court explicitly limited its holding to vehicle searches.295 Unlike a
vehicle, which the Court has held is associated with a reduced expectation
of privacy, a cell phone implicates a heightened expectation of privacy due
to the volume of highly personal information it is capable of storing.296
Therefore, even if Gant does have some precedential value outside the
vehicle context, it would be unreasonable to extend Gant to justify cell
phone searches.
Additionally, the middle approach would be difficult for police to apply
and courts to evaluate, likely leading to inconsistent results. Courts have
not clearly defined whether the reason-to-believe standard is equivalent to
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.297 Moreover, even in one of the
most common arrest situationsa drug arrestscholars do not agree that it
would be reasonable to believe an arrestee’s cell phone might contain
evidence related to his offense.298 An additional complication is that
smartphone ownership is not consistent across different racial,
socioeconomic, or age groups.299 Therefore, it may be objectively more
likely that incriminating data would be found on a phone seized from an
arrestee in a young, affluent community than from an individual in an older,
less wealthy area.300
Thus, the middle approach would encourage the type of post hoc
decisionmaking that the Supreme Court has sought to avoid in its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.301 Nuanced rules may appeal to judges and
lawyers, but they pose difficulties for officers in the field.302 Subtle
distinctions in the search incident to arrest context are particularly
291.
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296.
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298.
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302.
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troublesome because a search incident to arrest is the most common form of
law enforcement search, and police already have many factors to consider
during the dangerous and complicated situation of an arrest.303
C. The Narrow Approach Provides a Workable Framework and Protects
Individuals from Unreasonable Searches of Their Cell Phone Content
The narrow approach provides a workable framework that officers can
easily apply in the field.304 When a cell phone is found incident to an
arrest, police should be permitted to seize the phone but required to obtain a
warrant before examining its contents unless another established exception
to the warrant requirement applies. Although the broad approach also
provides a clear standard, only the narrow approach respects the principle
that the search incident to arrest exception is truly an exception and can
only be justified by significant law enforcement interests.305 When a cell
phone is seized incident to an arrest, there is no longer an exigency
justifying an examination of its contents.306 The government maintains a
broader interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest, but this
interest is served through the warrant process articulated in the Fourth
Amendment.307 Therefore, allowing a warrantless, general evidencegathering search of the highly personal information contained in a cell
phone would permit an unjustified exception to the warrant requirement.
CONCLUSION
The cell phone search incident to arrest issue exemplifies the challenges
of applying Fourth Amendment principles to modern technologies. Lower
courts have split on whether Robinson’s forty-year-old holding extends to
searches of cell phone data. In its upcoming decisions on this issue in
Wurie and Riley, the Supreme Court should recognize that cell phone
searches cannot be justified by the rationales for the search incident to arrest
exception. The Court should therefore affirm the First Circuit’s decision in
Wurie and hold that when a cell phone is found on an arrestee’s person
incident to an arrest, police are required to obtain a warrant before
examining its contents unless another established exception to the warrant
requirement applies.
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